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José Luis Alonso
ΠΙΣΤΙΣ IN LOAN TRANSACTIONS:
A NEW INTERPRETATION OF P. DION. 11–12
1. PISTIS IN THE DOCUMENTATION OF LOANS
Like the latin fides, the Greek πίστις was a highly productive legalnotion. The term πίστις was therefore inevitably polysemous: ‘oath’,
‘safe-conduct’, ‘credit’, ‘guarantee for a credit’, ‘personal surety’, ‘trust’ are
only some among its possible legal meanings,1 leaving aside its use as
translation for the Roman fides, notably regarding fideicommissa and in the
expression καλὴ πίστις. Such polysemy poses difficulties for the inter-
preter when the context does not make it clear which among the many
possible meanings the term adopts in a particular instance. This article
will discuss two cases in point, that some interpreters have seen as related:2
in the second part, the possible meaning of the expression τιθέναι ἐν
1 W. Schmitz, Ἡ πίστις in den Papyri, Aachen 1963: ‘Eid’ (pp. 10–17), ‘Schutzbrief’
(pp. 17–31), ‘Kredit’ (pp. 32–33), ‘Sicherheitsleistung bei Kreditgeschäften’ (pp. 34–64),
‘Vertrauensverhältnis, in dem der Vertrauende dem Vertrauensempfänger eine selb-
ständige und eigenverantwortliche Stellung einräumt’ (pp. 65–91), ‘Bürgschaft’ (pp. 91–97).
Cf. also J. Partsch, Griechisches Bürgschaftsrecht, Leipzig – Berlin 1909, pp. 359–362. For
the semantic shifts trustworthiness – trust – credit – security – documented security –
document, A. Manigk, ‘Gräko-ägyptisches Pfandrecht’, ZRG RA 30 (1909), pp. 307–310.
2 Cf. especially E. Rabel, ‘Nachgeformte Rechtsgeschäfte’, ZRG RA 28 (1907), pp. 358– 
–359; vid. infra n. 11; p. 22 and n. 34.
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πίστει συγγραφ4ὴν ὑποθήκης in P. Dion. 11–12 (108 bc, Hermopolites);
before, in this first section, we will consider a rather problematic group
of loans described as documented κατὰ πίστιν to the name of a third
party, who is neither the lender nor the borrower.
This latter type of transaction first came to light through a papyrus
edited in 1903 in the third volume of Oxyrhynchus: P. Oxy. iii 508 (ad
102), a homologia addressed to the lender, Heraklas, by this third party, 
a certain Stephanos, regarding two previous loans:
|5 … ὁµολογεῖ Στέφανος … |8 Ἡρακλᾶτι … |10 … γεγονέναι ἐπʼ ὀνόµατος
τοῦ ὁµολο|11γοῦντος Στεφάνου κατὰ πίστιν δάνεια δύο |12 ⟦  ⟧ ὧν ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου
ὁ Ἡρακλᾶς ἐδάνεισεν … |25 … ἅπ[ερ] |26 δάνειά ἐστ[ι παρὰ τῷ Ἡ]ρακλᾷ, 
ᾧ καὶ ἐ[ξεῖ|27ναι – c. ? – ]
The two loans, i.e., the loan deeds (both secured by hypothec), had
been executed, we read, κατὰ πίστιν to the name of Stephanos. Grenfell
and Hunt translate as follows: 
Stephanus … acknlowledges to Heraclas … that he, Stephanus, the contract-
ing party, has become security for two loans which Heraclas lent from his own
money … which loans are in Heraclas’ possession, and Heraclas has the right … 
In this interpretation, Stephanos’ πίστις is that of a guarantor, equi -
valent in function to the fides of a Roman fideiussor.3
Only three years later, the same kind of transaction appeared again, in
the first volume of the Florentine papyri: P. Flor. i 86 (= MChr. 247, after
ad 86, Hermopolites), a hypomnema addressed to the archidikastes of
Alexandria requesting execution of a hypothec by means of embadeia:
|1 … ὀφειλοµ[ένων … |2 … Εὐδ[αί]µονι … ὑπὸ Διδύµης … κ[αθʼ ἃ]ς
|3 [διέ]ταξεν ὁ αὐτ 2[ὸς] Ε2ὐ 2δαί[µων γεν]έσθ[α]ι κατὰ πίστιν εἰς Σαρα 2π2ι1[άδα]
… συνγρα]φὰς |4 [δαν]είων τρεῖς ἐφʼ ὑ[ποθ]ήκῃ κ[α]τ 2οι[κικαῖ]ς τῆς
10
3 In Roman law, the fideiussor is a guarantor who solemnly accepts that the debt shall be
covered by his own fides, by answering ‘id fide iubeo’ to the creditor’s question ‘id (quod
Titius debet) fide tua esse iubes?’ (cf. Gai 3.116).
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Διδύµης ἀρούραις δεκ2[α]ὲξ [τετ]άρτῳ … |5 … ἀργυρίου δρα[χµῶ]ν …
ἀκολού|10[θως ᾧ ἀ]νήνεγκεν ἡ [Σ]αραπιὰς πρὸς [τὸν] υἱόν µου Εὐδαίµωνα
περιόντα δ[η]µοσίῳ χρηµατισµῷ διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀγορανο|11[µείου] ἐπὶ τοῦ
αὐ[το]ῦ πέµπτου ἔτους [µην]ὸς Νέου Σεβαστοῦ ἐξοµολογουµένη τὴν
πίστην τῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν συνγρα|12[φῶν]…
The hypothec secured five loans granted by Eudaimon to Didyme. The
first three, as we read in the text above, were documented in three syn-
graphai (spanning from the first to the fourth year of Domitian, ad 82 to
85), that Eudaimon, the lender, had ordered to be executed κατὰ πίστιν for
a certain Sarapias: κ[αθʼ ἃ]ς [διέ]ταξεν ὁ αὐτ 2[ὸς] Ε 2ὐ 22δαί[µων γεν]έ σθ[α]ι
κατὰ πίστιν εἰς Σαρα 2π2ι1[άδα]… συνγρα]φὰς. Later, in Neos Sebastos of the
5th year of Domitian (October – November ad 86), when the debtor had
already defaulted on all three loans, this Sarapias, we are told, acknow -
ledged through the agoranomeion, by public document, the πίστις of the
three syngraphai.
The Florentine papyrus had already been edited by Breccia in 1904,4
but only Vitelli’s edition integrated the crucial κατὰ πίστιν εἰς Σαρα 2π2ι1[άδα].
Vitelli was fully conscious of the importance of this clause, and had been
notified by Mitteis of the Oxyrhynchus parallel.5 Led by this parallel, and
following Grenfell and Hunt, Vitelli understood the role of Sarapias as
that of a guarantor of the loans, who takes liability for them together with
the debtor.6
4 E. Breccia, ‘Da papiri greci dell’Egitto’, [in:] Rendiconti della Reale Accademia dei Lin-
cei, ser. v, 13 (1904), pp. 121–125.
5 Cf. his introduction to the papyrus (P. Flor. i, p. 169), and there also his interpretation
of Sarapias’ πίστις.
6 In Vitelli’s reconstruction of the events (P. Flor. i, p. 170), the intervention of Sarapias
as a guarantor takes place only in ad 86, through the agoranomic πίστις acknowledgment.
Vitelli imagines her intervention motivated by the fact that in the meantime she had
acquired from the debtor the hypothecated land, as we know through P. Flor. i 92 (ad 84,
Hermopolites). This interpretation, that makes Sarapias appear in the affair only as a
result of her acquisition of the land, and only in ad 86, is unacceptable, because incom-
patible with our document: ll. 2–5 unambiguously state that the name of Sarapias figured
from the beginning, by order of the lender, in the three loan syngraphai.
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It was the merit of Otto Gradenwitz to dispel this notion.7 His main
arguments are three:
1. First of all, in both papyri the loan appears as documented solely to
the name of the third party. Formally at least, therefore, these would not
be instances of guarantee, whereby someone undertakes liability together
with the borrower, but of something much rarer: someone assuming the
position of sole debtor in place of the borrower.
2. Secondly, if the role of Sarapias in P. Flor. i 86 were indeed that of
a substitute debtor (or of a co-debtor), it would be peculiar that the loans
are documented κατὰ πίστιν to her name by request of the creditor. A sub-
stitute debtor needs to be accepted by the creditor, but he intervenes by
request of the debtor, not of the creditor.
3. Much stranger still is the notion that the creditor would be inter-
ested in having this debtor explicitly admit to have acted κατὰ πίστιν, as
a mere substitute. And yet, such is the acknowledgment we have in
P. Oxy. iii 508, and the one mentioned in P. Flor. i 86 as received in pub-
lic document by the creditor. If Stephanos and Sarapias were substitute
or supplementary debtors, as Grenfell, Hunt, and Vitelli imagine, they
would be interested in receiving such acknowledgment from the bor -
rower, not the lender from them. For the lender to proceed against them,
the original loan document is enough. That they are not the true bor-
rowers is, for him, irrelevant, since they have accepted full liability. 
A document disclosing this circumstance is not something that the cred-
itor would request or even welcome.
To these arguments others still could be added. In P. Oxy. iii 508
Stephanos emphasizes not only that his role was merely that of a substi-
tute, but also that the money was the lender’s own, and that the loan doc-
12
7 O. Gradenwitz, ‘Alius mutuam dedit alius stipulatus est’, ZRG RA 27 (1906),
pp. 336–340. The title, ‘Alius mutuam etc.’, comes from Ulp. 29 ed. D. 14.6.7.7, where
someone other than the lender figures as creditor in the formal stipulation exacted from
the debtor. The same happens in our documents, according to Gradenwitz. His inter-
pretation was challenged only, in most aspects with scarce fortune, by Manigk, ‘Pfan-
drecht’ (cit. n. 1), pp. 311–314.
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uments are in the lender’s possession. It is difficult to imagine a reason
why a creditor would demand from his debtor a document acknowledg-
ing these particulars. They make perfect sense, instead, if we assume with
Gradenwitz that both Stephanos and Sarapias in P. Flor. i 86 did not
figure in the loan documents as debtors, but as creditors, in place of the
lender. These disclosures, then, become absolutely necessary for the lender
to recover his rights – and such seems to be the function of these πίστις-
acknowledgements. That is why the substitutes acknowledge that their
position was merely such, i.e. that they acted κατὰ πίστιν, as fiduciaries of
the lender. That is why Sarapias further stresses that she figured in the doc-
ument by order of the lender. That is also why Stephanos is  requested to
underline that the money lent did not belong to him, but to Heraklas; and
that the loan documents are in the hands of Heraklas; and, finally, that it is
Heraklas who may request execution against the debtor (if Grenfell and
Hunt’s intuition for the line where the document breaks is right, as it
seems). Such a document is obviously essential for the lender who decides
to bring the debtor to court, when the original loan document does not
mention the lender’s name as creditor, but that of someone else.
The fiduciary, in conclusion, is not a debtor, but a creditor. The new
papyri documenting the same phenomenon have only confirmed this
hypothesis. They are, in the order in which they have come to light, BGU
iv 1171 (10 bc Alexandria), SB iii 6663 (6–5 bc, provenance unknown), 
P. Mil. Vogl. i 25 (ad 127, Tebtynis), PSI xv 1527 (after ad 161, Oxyrhyn-
chos), and CPR vi 1 (ad 125, Ptolemais Euergetis).
The main mystery that these documents present remains unsolved,
though. Why would a lender permit someone to take his place as credi-
tor in a loan document? And why does the creditor’s right come back
inexorably, as it seems, to him? In sum, what causes the intervention of
this fiduciary as creditor κατὰ πίστιν? I cannot fully address this question
here, but I will present a critical review of the two main opinions, since
one of them has been invoked to explain P. Dion. 11–12, the document to
which the second part of this study will be devoted.
Two, in fact, are the main possibilities. A fiduciary may be a trustee,
acting in the interest of the lender; in this case, becoming creditor in his
place, and as such enabled to claim in trial in his stead. Or he may be a
13
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creditor of the lender, who acquires the right against the borrower as a
guarantee of his own credit. This same fundamental duality lies behind
the Roman categories of fiducia cum amico and fiducia cum creditore.8
The contrived second possibility – a credit securing another credit –
was not even contemplated by Gradenwitz. For him, our fiduciary is a
trustee. A trustee, he writes, in the ancient sense, in possession of the full
faculties of the creditor, akin to the Roman adstipulator.9 This raises a
question that Gradenwitz does not consider: why would the lender go so
far as bestowing his full rights on a trustee, when he had the much safer
option of merely appointing someone to represent him in trial. Precisely
the lack of such option in the old Roman procedure of the legis actiones
seems to have been the raison d’être of the figure of the adstipulator (and
the reason of its decadence in Imperial times, when, under the formulary
14
8 Gai 2.60: … fiducia contrahitur aut cum creditore pignoris iure aut cum amico, quo
tutius nostrae res apud eum essent … – fiduciary ownership is contracted either with a
creditor, holding the property as a pledge, or with a friend with whom our property is
placed for safe-keeping… . On Roman fiducia, B. Noordraven, Die Fiducia im römischen
Recht, Amsterdam 1999. The analogy ends in the duality trustee-creditor: Roman fiducia
referred to property, while our case concerns a credit.
9 Gradenwitz, ‘Alius mutuam dedit’ (cit. n. 7), p. 339: ‘Denn Sarapias wie Stephanos
sind im wesentlichen zu dem gleichen Zwecke eingeschoben, wie die adstipulatores in
Rom der stipulatio hinzutraten. Sie sind Treuhänder im antiken Sinne …, im Besitze aller
Rechtsmacht, die der materiell Berechtigte haben soll …’. In Roman law, the adstipulator
was a trustee of the creditor, invested with full rights as a co-creditor, so that he could
receive payment but also claim the debt for him. The figure had fallen into disuse long
before Justinian, and it is not to be found in the Corpus Iuris. It was re-discovered only in
1816, when Gaius’ Institutions were found in Verona: cf. Gai. 3.110–114. The discovery of
Gaius also put an end to the speculations about the second chapter of the Aquilian enact-
ment, a third century bc plebiscite: it contained a penalty against those adstipulatores who
deprived the creditor of his right by formally releasing the debtor. These particulars are
invoked by Gradenwitz, who writes for scholars trained in the categories of Roman law,
to explain our papyri: the lender, he explains, needs to protect himself from a possible
breach of trust; that was the aim of lex Aquilia in its second chapter, and that is also the
purpose of the document whereby in our case the trustee formally acknowledges his con-
dition. Since the function of this document is to recover from the trustee one’s rights as
creditor, Gradenwitz further compares the case to transplanting to adsipulatio the actio
fiduciae whereby we claim back the property we have entrusted to someone’s custody
(supra n. 8).
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procedure, there was no longer an obstacle for representation in trial).10
Without an answer to this question, Gradenwitz’ theory seems untenable.
The alternative possibility, that the fiduciary receives the credit as a
security for a debt that the lender had with him, has also found occasional
advocates, at least for some of the documents.11 The transaction would be
analogous in function, if not in legal structure, to what came to be known
in the Roman legal tradition as pignus nominis: 12 a security constituted not
on a a thing but on a credit. This interpretation is in line with a certain
tendency in the scholarship to assume, when the context is poor, that
‘pledge’ is the most likely legal meaning of the term πίστις.13 The docu-
ments offer little support for this hypothesis, though: not a single one
ever mentions a pre-existing debt between the lender and the fiduciary.
10 The idea is already in S. Perozzi, Istituzioni di diritto romano ii, Roma 1928 (2 ed.),
p. 222, n. 4. The general rule excluding representation under the legis actiones, and its
exceptions, are known to us through Gai. 4.82, Inst. 4.10 pr., and Ulp. 14 ed. (D. 50.17.123 pr.)
Cf. M. Kaser, Das römische Zivilprozessrecht, München 1996 (2 ed.), pp. 62–63, with lit.
11 Most categorically, Schmitz, Ἡ πίστις (cit. n. 1), pp. 52–64, for the cases of P. Oxy. iii
508, BGU iv 1171, and even P. Mil. Vogl. i 25. Cf. also, regarding specifically BGU iv 1171,
H. J. Wolff, ‘An Oxyrhynchus Receipt for the Repayment of Loans’, TAPhA 71 (1940),
p. 622. The conjecture was no longer mentioned a year later, though, when considering
the same document: H. J. Wolff, ‘Praxis-provision in Papyrus-Contracts, TAPhA 72
(1941), p. 437 = ‘Die Praxisklausel in Papyrusverträgen’, [in:] Beiträge zur Rechtsgeschichte
Altgriechenlands und des hellenistisch-römischen Ägypten, Weimar 1961, pp. 126–127. The first
scholar to (cautiously) suggest this hypothesis was Rabel, ‘Nachgeformte’ (cit. n. 2), 
pp. 358–359: after endorsing Gradenwitz’ interpretation of P. Oxy. iii 508 and P. Flor. i 86,
he adds ‘… wenn auch viel leicht der Grund der Fiduzia wieder in einer Sicherung des
Treuhänders liegen mochte’.
12 Cf. M. Kaser, ‘Pignus nominis’, Iura 20 (1969), pp. 172–190. Kaser argues convincingly
that the Roman pignus nominis did not function as a mere assignment of the credit against
the debtor – as it is most likely for its Greek counterpart. There are, in fact, reasons to
think that in Roman law the action against the debtor was not the original one, trans-
ferred to the new creditor (as commonly assumed before Kaser), but an adaptation of the
common formula hypothecaria. Only the latter would make possible to verify in trial three
circumstances without which adjudication in favour of the hypothecarian creditor would
be unconceivable: the existence of the hypothec itself, that of the secured debt, and the
lack of payment.
13 Cf. for instance R. Bagnall & Rafaella Cribiore, Women’s Letters from Ancient Egypt, Ann
Arbor 2006, p. 293, on P. Mert. i 32, l. 2, where the meaning of the term is anything but clear.
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This silence is especially remarkable in the documents whereby the
lender receives his right back from the fiduciary: if this happened because
the lender had paid his due to the fiduciary, he would have all the interest
in having the fiduciary acknowledge this crucial fact in the document.
And yet, in all the cases that we know of, there is not a word of this. 
If there was a practice of pignus nominis in the Greek tradition, these
documents are not the evidence needed to prove it.14 The practice they
do attest, of loan documents executed not to the name of the lender but
to the name of a fiduciary creditor, seems to have been common
enough, but a convincing explanation for it remains, nevertheless, to be
found.
16
14 SB xx 15188 (P. Flor. iii 318 + P. Lond. iii 1164a, ad 212, Antinoopolis), would be such
evidence, a credit assigned as security, according to P. van Minnen. ‘Gesuch und Bestel-
lung eines Kyrios’, ZPE 93 (1992), pp. 191–204, followed in this point also by J. Hengstl,
‘Rechtsprobleme in neueren papyrologischen Arbeiten’, AfP 40 (1994), pp. 91–94. But
van Minnen’s interpretation, although ingenious, is ultimately not convincing. 
A hypallagma over a credit, as van Minnen conjectures, would be totally unprecedented,
and hardly compatible with the nature of hypallagma as a non-alienation agreement. 
Furthermore, the αὐτῷ who shall receive the hypallagma from Demetria is for sure not the
unnamed daughter of Aretion (as van Minnen conjectures, forcing himself to read αὐτῷ
as a lapsus calami for αὐτῇ), but very likely Sabinos, the grandson of Demetria. The kernel
of the situation seems to be the following: when Demetria, as phrontistria of her grandson,
collects a debt due to him, her liability to reimburse him the collected amount must be
secured. The hypallagma seems to have precisely this function. That is why we are told
that the hypallagma will be contracted πρὸς [ἐπιµ]έ2λιαν, where epimeleia is not the duty of
the wet nurse imagined by van Minnen (on this, already Hengstl, cit.) but the cura of
the grandmother as phrontistria (l. 10–12: βουλ 2ο 2[µένη πρὸς ἐπιµ]έ1λιαν τοῦ προκειµένου
ἀφήλικος… ὑπαλλάξαι αὐτο). Crucial also is the phrase ὑπαλλάξαι αὐτο… ἀντὶ τῶν περι -
λυ[θει]σ2[ῶ]ν ὑπʼ ἐµοῦ δρ]α2χµῶν … ὀφ<ει>ληθε1[ισῶν … µου 2 υἱῷ Σαβίνῳ (ll. 11–13). 
This ἀντὶ τῶν κτλ. prompted van Minnen to imagine that the new hypallagma substitutes
for the cancelled credit (of the son) that functioned as security until then. There is a much
more simple interpretation, though: in security contracts (cf. P. Flor. i 81, l. 12, P. Strasb.
i 52, ll. 7–8, and P. Flor. i 1, l.7, all from 2nd cent. ad, Hermopolis), ἀντὶ τῶν ὀφειλοµένων
simply means that the security ‘substitutes’ for the debt, since it secures its payment
(and, when the security is a hypothec, it is accepted in lieu of payment). This seems to
be what our document means by saying that the  hypallagma is given in place of the can-
celled debt.
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2. TIYENAI EN PISTEI SUGGRAFHN UPOYHKHS: 
P. DION. 11–12
In the 10th year of Ptolemy ix Soter and Cleopatra iii, 108 bc, Thoth 24
and 25, two practically identical petitions of Dionysios, son of Kephalas,
were granted by the strategos and the basilikoi grammateis of the Her-
mopolites:15 P. Dion. 11 (= P. Lugd. Bat. xxii 11 = P. Rein. i 18 = MChr. 26 =
Sel. Pap. ii 277), and P. Dion. 12 (= P. Rein. i 19 = MChr. 27). As we learn
from these documents, in the previous year Dionysios and his mother had
executed with a certain Admetos a loan syngraphe for 150 artabae of
wheat, further secured by a hypothec syngraphe on some vacant land. Now
the sowing season has arrived, and Dionysios argues that the harassment
of the creditor impedes his work as cultivator of royal land, in violation
of the royal prostagmata. Therefore, in P. Dion. 11 he addresses the strate-
gos, requesting that the epistates of the village of Akoris be instructed, so
that the creditor does not further disturb him or his mother. He also
requests written safeconducts,16 to keep them formally protected until
the end of the season, when he will face the creditor’s demands. 
In P. Dion. 12, he petitions the basilikoi grammateis that also the xenikoi
praktores refrain until then from execution. Both requests are granted, in
compliance with the royal prostagmata.17
15 On this anomalous plurality of basilikoi grammateis, cf. P. Dion. i, p. 174, comm. ad l. 6.
For the reason why the basilikos grammateus is involved in the question at all, particularly
regarding the xenikoi praktores, cf. the introduction to MChr. 27 (p. 22).
16 On these πίστεις, Schmitz, Ἡ πίστις (cit. n. 16), pp. 17–31, with lit., and the discussion
in P. Dion. i, p. 170, comm. ad l. 31.
17 The royal legislation is invoked by Dionysios in both documents, and also explicitly
by the basilikoi grammateis as the basis for their decision in P. Dion. 12, l. 4. These prostag-
mata protected cultivators of royal land from their creditors during the cultivation period,
and were still invoked in the time of Augustus: cf. Marie-Thérèse Lenger, Corpus des
Ordonnances des Ptolémées, Bruxelles 1980 (2 ed.), All. 82, 110, 115. In the face of these
sources, ours included, it seems unjustified to hold (P. Dion., p. 170, comm. ad ll. 20–22) that
there were no precise prostagmata applicable to our case: despite Boswinkel and Pestman,
there is nothing unconceivable in a legislation protecting cultivators from litigation in
certain critical periods of the year (cf. the Roman parallel of the oratio divi Marci in
D. 2.12.1–7). And precisely because Dionysios’ plea is firmly supported by the royal legis-
17
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This and the other wheat loans preserved in Dionysios’ archive have
attracted attention due to their sheer number – twenty four (!) in the
twelve years from 116 to 104 bc – and due to the very considerable
amount of wheat borrowed each year, well beyond the needs of a family.18
Such needs, on the other hand, Dionysios should have been able to meet
without credit, since he was by no means poor.19 Two different questions
arise here. What was the purpose of so much wheat? And why was it bor-
rowed, and not bought?
The first question prompted Boswinkel and Pestman, in their edition
of P. Dion., to suggest that the wheat may have been destined to the
sacred ibises that Dionysios had to feed as part of his priestly duties.20
Orsolina Montevecchi, 21 instead, called attention to the subscription in
two of the documents: an apoche whereby Dionysios declares to have
received the price of the wheat, not the wheat itself to which the con-
18
lation, it is misleading to present it as ‘an argument of practical nature, that chooses to
ignore the legal aspects of the affair’ – so P. Dion., p. 165: ‘L’argument qu’il utilise dans sa
requête, et qui permettra de donner bonne suite à sa demande, est de nature pratique, et
passe sous silence les aspects juridiques de l’affaire’. Contra, cf. already Mitteis, who
included in the Chrestomathie our two documents as instances of ‘Ladungsprivilegien’
(‘summons privileges’: MChr., pp. 21–23; cf. also Grundzüge, p. 18).
18 An estimation in P. Dion., pp. 9–15. Any estimation must take the following into
account: a) when, as in Dionysios’ loans, there is no explicit interest rate, the documented
amount is almost certainly higher than the amount actually borrowed: for loans in kind,
the eds. of P. Dion. rightly assume a 50% interest rate, so that a loan documented for 150
artabae means 100 actually borrowed; b) in some cases the loan is only nominally of wheat
(infra, n. 22), but actually of money; c) sometimes the loan is not a new one, but the renew-
al of a preexisting debt (infra, n. 50); d) it cannot be excluded that Dionysios took yet fur-
ther loans lost to us.
19 Leaving cattle aside, we know that he owned at least a garden (leased out in 106 bc: P.
Dion. 5), the vacant land that he hypothecated with Admetos (P. Dion. 11–12), and some
cultivated land that he leased out in 110 bc for 100 artabae a year (P. Dion. 1), an amount
of wheat that should suffice for himself and his family. More property, not documented
in the archive, is also likely.
20 For their summary and discussion of Dionysios’ ‘strange’ (their expression) wheat
borrowing activity, P. Dion., pp. 9–22. The ibis-hypothesis is improbable, cf. N. Lewis,
‘Notationes legentis’, BASP 20 (1983), p. 57.
21 Orsolina Montevecchi, rev. of P. L. Bat. xxii (P. Dion.), Aegyptus 65 (1985), pp. 226–227.
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tracts nominally refer.22 These are not actual wheat loans, but money
loans to be repaid in wheat.23 This is hardly the case of the other loans in
the archive, though: the very fact that the apoche refers to the price only
in these two, while all the other subscriptions declare the wheat as actually
delivered,24 would be enough to exclude such assumption.
As for the second question, Dionysios’ borrowing mania, it has pre-
dictably been taken as a symptom of financial difficulties, so pressing that
he was forced to pay off defaulted debts by contracting new ones.25 This
22 P. Dion. 22 (= P. Rein. i 10, 111 bc, Akoris), ll. 29–31: Διονύσιος Κεφαλᾶτος Πέρσ]η2ς2 τ 2ῆ2ς2
ἐ1π2ι1γ4ο 2ν2ῆ2ς1 ἀ2π2έ1χ3ω2 τ 2ὴ2ν2 τιµὴν τῶν [εἴκοσι τεσσάρων ἀρτα]β1ῶν τ 2ο 2ῦ 2 σ 2τ 2ε1ρ 1ε1ο 2ῦ 2 π2υ 2ρ 1ο 2ῦ 2 κ2α 2ὶ1 π2ά2ν2τα
π2ο 2ι1ή 2σω καθʼ ὅτι [πρόκειται καὶ δέδ]ωκα κυρίαν Δωριεῖ. The same formula, in the sub-
scription of P. Dion. 21 (= P. Ross. Georg. ii 6 = P. Rein. i 34, 113 bc, Akoris), ll. 32–34.
23 More precisely: they are wheat loans from a merely formal point of view, yet substan-
tially equivalent to a sale of wheat for future delivery, rather than to a simple money loan.
24 The documents are P. Dion. 13 (= P. Rein. i 9, 112 bc), ll. 34–36; P. Dion. 15 (= P. Rein. i
15, 109 bc), ll. 32–34; P. Dion. 16 (= P. Rein. i 16, 109 bc), ll. 40–47; P. Dion. 18 (= P. Rein. i
22, 107 bc), ll. 32–34; P. Dion. 19 (= P. Rein. i 23, 105 bc), ll. 31–33. The other loan documents
do not include a subscription.
25 Thus, praecipue P. W. Pestman, ‘Dionysios, son of Kephalas. A bilingual family
archive from Ptolemaic Egypt’, [in:] Acta Orientalia Neerlandica. Leiden 1971, pp. 19–21.
Both here and in P. Dion., p. 166, Pestman illustrates his hypothesis through the events of
the late 108 bc, after Dionysios obtained the safe-conduct against Admetos documented in
our two papyri (P. Dion. 11–12, 12 October). This is how Pestman reconstructs the subse-
quent events: two months later, in december 16th, Dionysios sells two cows that he must
have needed for cultivation (P. Dion. 4), and takes two small wheat loans, evidently need-
ed – so Pestman – for personal consumption (P. Dion. 3 and 17); three days later (19
December), he takes a new loan of 150 artabae, forced no doubt – Pestman again – to get
into a new debt in order to finally pay off the one with Admetos, ‘thus robbing Peter to pay
Paul’. In this narrative there are many unwarranted assumptions: that Dionysios needed the
cows for his own cultivation, that the small loans are destined to his personal consump-
tion, and, especially, that the bigger loan is destined to pay off the debt with Admetos.
The coincidence in the amounts, 150 artabae in both cases, makes this last assumption
particularly tempting (‘il pourrait difficilement s’agir ici d’un hasard’, Pestman and
Boswinkel write), and also demonstrably misconceived: Pestman takes rightly for granted
that wheat loans are obtained at a 50% interest rate, so that Dionysios would have actu-
ally received from Admetos only 100 artabae, even if he now owes him 150; but this also
means that in order to cancel this debt he would have needed to incur a new one of 225.
The fact that the new loan is again for 150 artabae, therefore, is very far from proving that
it was taken to pay off the previous one.
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seemingly so simple explanation raises its own paradox. Twelve years
seem too long a period for a debtor in perpetual default to still find
lenders ready to trust him. Dionysios must have been able to pay off the
loans, or else he would not have obtained credit for so long.26 This very
consideration may help solve our first question, explaining why in most
cases Dionysios does not borrow money, but wheat, and in such amount.
It is not because he needs it himself, for his family or for the ibises in his
charge, but in order to obtain profit by re-selling or lending it. Naphtali
Lewis has made a strong case for this possibility,27 showing that the loans
were consistently taken at the end of the harvest season, when the grain
prices must have been at their lowest. Dionysios would then wait for the
prices to rise, obtaining benefit by selling or lending the wheat in smaller
amounts to poorer peasants in times of scarcity: of such transactions,
though, there is no trace in the archive.
As for the loan that prompted Dionysios’ plea in P. Dion. 11 and 12, this
is how the situation is described, in identical terms in both documents28
(the line indications are those of the better preserved P. Dion. 11):
|4 … διὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγµατος ὑπο|5δειχθησοµ2έ[ν]ας αἰτίας γραψαµένου
ἐµοῦ τε |6 καὶ τῆς µη2[τρ]ός µου Σεναβολλοῦτος Ἀδµή|7τῶι τῶι καὶ Χ 2εσ -
θώτηι τῶν ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς |8 κώµης συγ 4γ4ρ 1αφὴν δανείου διὰ τοῦ µνηµο|9νείου
πυρῶν2 (ἀρταβῶν) ρν ἐν τῶι θ (ἔτει), οὐ µόνον, |10 δʼ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐθέµ 2ην αὐτῶι1
ἐν πίστει καθʼ ὧν |11 ἔχω ψιλῶν τό 2π2ων συγγραφ3ὴν ὑποθήκης· |12 ὁ ἐγ κα λού -
µεν2ο 2ς ἐγκρατὴς2 γενόµενος |13 τῶν συναλλάξ 3[ε]ω 2ν οὐθὲν τῶν διασ ταθέντων
20
26 In this sense, J. F. Oates, ‘The status designation Πέρσης τῆς ἐπιγονῆς’, Yale Classical
Studies 18 (1963), pp. 89–90.
27 Lewis, ‘Notationes legentis’ (cit. n. 20), pp. 55–58; idem, Greeks in Ptolemaic Egypt: Case
Studies in the Social History of the Hellenistic World, Oxford 1986, pp. 129–131. His hypothesis is
reproduced, in an unduly apodictic way, by M. Chauveau, ĽÉgypte au temps de Cléopâtre,
Paris 1997 = Egypt in the Age of Cleopatra: History and Society Under the Ptolemies, New York
2000, pp. 156–158. Cf. also J. G. Manning, Land and Power in Ptolemaic Egypt, Cambridge
2003, pp. 191–192; more decidedly later, in The Last Pharaohs: Egypt Under the Ptolemies,
305–30 bc, Princeton 2010, p. 135.
28 Lacunae aside, P. Dion. 11 diverges minimally from 12: πυρῶν2 in l. 9, compared to πυροῦ in
P. Dion. 12, l. 9; ὀλί[α] in l. 15, instead of the correct ὀλίγα in P. Dion. 12, l. 11 (cf. P. Dion., p. 169,
comm. ad l. 15). For the errors of the copyist of P. Dion. 12, cf. the editors’ remarks in p. 166.
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|14 µοι πρὸς αὐτὸ 2ν2 ἐπὶ τέλος ἤγαγεν, ὧν |15 χάριν οὐκ ὀλί[α] µοι βλάβη διʼ
αὐτὸν παρη|16κολούθησεν … – ‘… For reasons which shall be disclosed in
trial, my mother Senabollous and myself issued to Admetos, also called
Chesthotes, from the same village, a loan syngraphe for 150 artabae of
wheat, through the mnemoneion, in the 9th year; not only, but I also gave29
him in trust a hypothec syngraphe regarding some vacant land that I own;
having obtained these contracts, the accused complied with nothing of
the agreed, due to which not little harm has come to me for his cause …’.
Boswinkel and Pestman, assuming an interest rate of 50%, standard
for loans in kind, calculate that Dionysios actually borrowed in this case
100 artabae.30 Like them, all the scholars who have so far considered
these documents assume that this was an actual wheat loan, and a per-
fectly ordinary one at that.
Yet, for an ordinary loan there are many strange elements in the peti-
tion. As Mitteis noticed, 31 it is peculiar, for instance, the way in which the
hypothecation is described. Instead of merely saying that he has hypoth-
ecated the land with Admetos, Dionysios says that he has given him in
trust a hypothec syngraphe: ἐθέµ 2ην αὐτῶι1 ἐν πίστει καθʼ ὧν ἔχω ψιλῶν
τό 2π2ων συγγραφ4ὴν ὑποθήκης. This could merely mean that Dionysios exe-
cuted the hypothec syngraphe as a guarantee for Admetos – and, indeed,
it is so understood by the editors of both P. Rein. i and P. Dion.32 But,
given the ambiguity of the verb τίθηµι, and the remarkable emphasis on
the document as its object, it could also mean, as Mitteis points out, that
Dionysios hypothecated with Admetos a hypothec syngraphe: that is, 
a pre-existing one that he had received from a debtor of his.33 If so, the
29 On this ἐθέµ1ην αὐτῶι1 … συγγραφ3ὴν, ‘I executed with him a syngraphe’, or ‘I deposited’
or even ‘hypothecated with him a syngraphe’, cf. infra, pp. 21–24.
30 P. Dion., pp. 164 and 169, comm. ad ll. 5–9, cf. supra, n. 18.
31 L. Mitteis, ‘Neue Urkunden’, ZRG RA 26 (1905), pp. 489–490.
32 P. Dion., p. 169, comm. ad ll. 9–11; P. Rein. i, p. 97: ‘je lui ai signé en garantie un contrat
d’hypothèque.’
33 Mitteis, ‘Neue Urkunden’ (cit. n. 31), p. 489: ‘Die Worte sind freilich zweideutig
genug; man kann mit R. an eine Verpfändung von ψιλοὶ τόποι denken, die dem Schuldner
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text would prove a practice of pignus nominis in Egypt, although in this
case the hypothecated credit is such that the debtor’s liability has been
absorbed by a hypothec, and thus it is this hypothec to be hypothecated,
rather than the credit. Unsurprisingly, Ernst Rabel, following this inter-
pretation, links the document to the already discussed (supra, pp. 10–16)
P. Oxy. iii 508 and P. Flor. i 86, where, as we have seen, he equally sus-
pects that the credit (in both cases secured by a hypothec) may have func-
tioned as a security for the fiduciary.34
This alternative interpretation, though, is hardly compatible with
Dionysios’ statement that the hypothecated land belongs to him: καθʼ ὧν
ἔχω ψιλῶν τό 2π2ων. It could still be argued that, as hypothecary creditor,
Dionysios would have a sort of suspended property on the land, but this
would be a rather strained interpretation of his claim.35 Mitteis himself
considered the hypothesis of a sub-hypothecation less likely on the basis
of the written πίστεις requested by Dionysios in line 31. Contrary to what
Mitteis seems to assume, though, these πίστεις are safeconducts requested
from the strategos, and not the same documents that he had issued or 
others that he may want from the creditor.36 In any case, as Mitteis con-
cludes, the expression τιθέναι ἐν πίστει συγ γραφ4ὴν ὑποθήκης is ‘remark-
ably twisted and legally unclear’.37
22
gehörten; ebensogut aber auch an eine Afterverpfändung, d.h. Verpfändung einer
συγγραφ3ὴ ὑποθ., die der Schuldner selbst als Gläubiger eines Dritten bezüglich der ψιλοὶ
τόποι sich hatte ausstellen lassen.’
34 Rabel,’Nachgeformte’ (cit. n. 2), pp. 358–359, and supra n. 11.
35 So already Manigk, ‘Pfandrecht’ (cit. n. 1), p. 315 and n. 1.
36 Cf. Mitteis himself, seven years later, in MChr. 26, comm. ad ll. 31 (p. 22). Wrong in
this respect also Manigk, ‘Pfandrecht’ (cit. n. 1), p. 315 s., and Rabel, ‘Nachgeformte’ (cit.
n. 2), p. 359, n. 2. Both, like Mitteis initially, imagine these πίστεις as coming from the
creditor: either as a written guarantee that he will not request execution, or, as in P. Oxy.
iii 508 and P. Flor. i 86 (supra, pp. 10–13), as the documents whereby the creditor acknowl-
edges his condition of mere fiduciary owner; Rabel, in fact, considers the possibility that
the hypothecation of the land was a fiduciary sale, as the ὠνὴ ἐν πίστει of MChr. 233 (see,
infra, p. 24 and n. 42).
37 Mitteis, ‘Neue Urkunden’ (cit. n. 31), pp. 489–490: ‘merkwürdig geschraubt und
juristisch unklar’.
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In fact, we have no other document where the hypothecation itself is
said to be made ἐν πίστει,38 unless we count as such one that became
renowned and disputed as soon as it was published by Gerhard in 1904,
with a commentary by Gradenwitz:39 MChr. 233 (111 bc, Pathyris), a can-
cellation of mortgage where we read: ἐπελύσατο Πανοβχοῦνις … ὠνὴν
ψιλοῦ τόπου… ὃν ὑπέθετο… Πατοῦτι… καὶ Βοκεν2ο 2ύ 2π2ε2ι1 … κατὰ συγ -
γραφὴν ὠνῆς ἐν πίστει.40 The conjecture that the Roman mancipatio fidu-
ciae causa and the Greek πρᾶσις ἐπὶ λύσει had a Ptolemaic parallel in a
figure called ὠνὴ ἐν πίστει stems from Gradenwitz’ interpretation of this
text. But in this phrase, as it was soon pointed out, ἐν πίστει may qualify
not ὠνὴ but συγγραφή41 – or, much less likely, ὑπέθετο, and only this lat-
ter improbable assumption would provide a parallel to our text.
38 In a series of well known documents, the expression ἐν πίστει qualifies a sale or a pur-
chase or the way property is held or registered: BGU iii 993 (127 bc, Hermonthis) col. iii,
l. 11: … καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ὑπάρχον αὐτῶι ἐστιν ἤτ<ο>ι κατὰ συνβόλαια ἢ κατ’ ἐπενέχυρον καὶ
ἔν τισιν ἐν πίστει …; P. Oxy. iii 472 (ad 131, Oxyrhynchos), ll. 23–25: … τῶν γὰρ ἐν πίστει
καταγραφέ1ντων τὸ ὄνοµα µ[ό]νον εἰς τοὺς χρηµατισµοὺς παρε[θ]έν2τ 2ων …, cf., referred to
the same case, P. Oxy. iii 486 (= MChr. 59, ad 131, Oxyrhynchos), l. 26: … φάσκων κατὰ
πίστιν . . [ . . ] . ἐ1γ4γεγράφθαι …; BGU ii 464 (after ad 138, Arsinoites), l. 3: … [α]ὐτὰ τὴν
[γ]ενοµένην πρᾶ[σ]ιν [ἐ]ν πίστι γεγονέναι …; P. Oxy. lx 4060 (ad 161 , Oxyrhynchos), l. 51:
… [ἀ]ν2αζητῆσαι δὲ καὶ ε1[ἴ τινα ἄ]λλον πόρον κέκ2τ 2η2ται παρʼ ἡµεῖν ἐπὶ1 το 2ῦ 2 ἰ1δ 2ί1ο 2υ 2
ὀ 2ν2ό 2[µα]τ 2[ος] ἢ ἑτέρων ἐν πίστ 2[ει] …; P. Oxy. vi 980 verso (3rd. cent. ad, Oxyrhynchos): …
Κορνήλιος ποικιλτὴς τιµῆς οἰκίας ἐν π2ίστε1ι ἰς ἣν τιµῆς (δραχµαὶ) ΄Β … It is generally
assumed that in all these cases ἐν πίστει means that the items are sold, bought, held, or
registered in guarantee, securing the payment of a debt. The assumption is far from cer-
tain, though, particularly for P. Oxy. iii 472, and P. Oxy. lx 4060, where the expression
could very well refer to a trustee, not to a secured creditor. In any case, even if these doc-
uments, or some of them, contained fiduciary sales fulfilling the role of hypothecations,
none of them links ἐν πίστει to the verb τιθέναι or ὑποτιθέναι.
39 G. A. Gerhard, ‘Ὠνὴ ἐν πίστει’, Philologus 63 (1904), pp. 498–583; the commentary by
O. Gradenwitz, in pp. 577–583.
40 The same expression is conjectured in P. Adl. G 2 (124 bc Pathyris), l. 8: … κ[ατὰ
συγγραφὴν ὠνῆς ἐν πίστει …].
41 Therefore, there would have been no legal figure called ὠνὴ ἐν πίστει, but merely a
συγγραφὴ ὠνῆς that in the case of MChr. 233 happens to be executed ἐν πίστει, ‘in guar-
antee’: so, against Gradenwitz, Manigk, ‘Pfandrecht’ (cit. n. 1), p. 307. The fact that the
expression ὠνὴ ἐν πίστει has not appeared so far in any other document makes it reason-
able to keep Manigk’s scepticism.
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A deeper connection between P. Dion. 11–12 and MChr. 233 was postu-
lated by Ernst Rabel.42 Rabel shares Mitteis’ wonder at the construction
τιθέναι ἐν πίστει συγγραφ4ὴν ὑποθήκης in P. Dion. 11–12, and contemplates
also his conjecture that it may have been a previously contracted
hypothec that the creditor receives, possibly in guarantee. Yet the
expression may also – so Rabel – have the same meaning as ὑπέθετο …
κατὰ συγγραφὴν ὠνῆς ἐν πίστει in MChr. 233: both would simply refer to
a fiduciary sale. The fact that in our document we find τιθέναι ἐν πίστει
instead of ὠνὴ ἐν πίστει could merely be yet another example of how in
legal language the actual transaction (here, the sale) often hides behind
the cause (here, the guarantee), as still happens in many modern legal
expressions, the German ‘Pfandfiduzia’ offering a very close parallel. 
The passage, in any case – Rabel concludes – is indeed ambiguous.43
The oddities of P. Dion. 11–12 go well beyond the τιθέναι clause that
puzzled Mitteis and Rabel. Dionysios commences his request announcing
that in the course of the future trial the reasons will be revealed why he
and his mother issued the loan contract to Admetos. Here again we find
the same peculiar emphasis in the document: Dionysios does not say that
he and his mother took the loan, but, remarkably, only that they issued a
loan syngraphe (ll. 6–8: γραψαµένου ἐµοῦ τε καὶ τῆς µη2[τρ]ός µου … Ἀδ -
µήτῶι … συγ 4γ 4ρ 1αφὴν δανείου). Striking also is the inexplicable weight
given to the motives why the document was issued: in an ordinary loan, the
motives to take it are hardly relevant as means of defence for the debtor,
and yet here they seem to be the core of Dionysios’ future strategy in trial.
It is difficult not to connect all this with yet another remarkable asser-
tion of Dionysios: Admetos, once in possession of both the loan and the
hypothec syngraphai, did not comply with anything of the previously
agreed (ll. 12–14: ὁ ἐγκαλούµεν2ο 2ς ἐγκρατὴς2 γενόµενος τῶν συναλλάξ 3[ε]ω2ν
οὐθὲν τῶν διασταθέντων µοι πρὸς αὐτὸ 2ν2 ἐπὶ τέλος ἤγαγεν). An ordinary
loan creates no duties for the lender that the borrower may reproach him
for not fulfilling, let alone such that he may use to dispute the lender’s
24
42 Rabel, ‘Nachgeformte’ (cit. n. 2), p. 359. Contra, Schmitz, Ἡ πίστις (cit. n. 1), pp. 34–36.
43 ‘Der Passus ist aber gewiß vieldeutig genug’, Rabel, ‘Nachgeformte’ (cit. n. 2), p. 359.
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claim. One may think that Dionysios merely struggles to justify his own
default invoking unrelated agreements that Admetos has not honoured.44
This sort of argument is hardly surprising in a defaulting debtor, but it is
not what we read in the text. The document clearly implies a connection
between these agreements and the loan. The editors of P. Dion. suggest a
possible connection: in the wheat loans of the archive, the document exe-
cuted in Hermopolis usually predates the actual delivery of the wheat,
that takes place only later in Akoris. This reflects the universal practice
of requesting borrowers to undertake liability in advance, before actually
receiving the sum.45 Dionysios’ allegation would be, so the editors con-
jecture, that he did not receive the agreed amount of wheat in full.46
Yet, if that was the case, one wonders what stops him from stating it
clearly in his plea, which would thus become notably more forceful. Fur-
thermore, this conjecture leaves unexplained the weight that Dionysios
gives to the reasons for which the loan documents were issued, and how
these reasons may be connected with Admetos’ breach of contract.
44 So Boswinkel & Pestman, in P. Dion., p. 168, comm. ad l. 4. They assume that Dionysios
aspires merely to a setoff between his debt and the damages he claims to have suffered.
Cf. also p. 171, comm. ad ll. 33–34.
45 It is widely believed that the Roman stipulatio was often requested from the borrower in
advance: this has been the traditional explanation for the so-called exceptio non nume ratae
pecuniae, a defence granted under Caracalla to those debtors who never actually received
the loan. Cf. M. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht i, München 1971 (2 ed.), p. 542, with lit.,
and, among the studies published since, Maria Rosa Cimma, De non numerata pecunia,
Milano 1984, and W. Litewski, ‘Non numerata pecunia im klassischen römischen
Recht’, SDHI 60 (1994), pp. 405–456.
46 P. Dion., p. 169, comm. ad ll. 12–13. Boswinkel and Pestman assume that this argument
of Dionysios is mere pretense, that in truth he has no real defence against Admetos’ claim
(cf. also p. 165). This assumption is based on two arguments: a) the fact that he takes
refuge in his privileges as royal cultivator to merely defer payment; b) the loan that he
takes only two months later precisely for 150 artabae (P. Dion. 23), since the coincidence
in the amounts would show that its purpose is to finally pay Admetos his due. Both argu-
ments are fallacious. On the second, cf. supra, n. 25. The first is equally flawed: in general, a
debtor may use a dilatory exception, when such is available, even if he has a peremptory one;
in simpler terms, the fact that Dionysios uses his privilege to defer the trial does not prove
that he lacks any other defence; it does not even make him suspicious of not having one;
even having a defence, it would be reasonable to postpone the trial until the end of the
sowing period.
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A better explanation for all these oddities comes by itself if we take
them at face value: Dionysios states that he issued a loan syngraphe, never
that he received a loan; he underlines that the hypothec syngraphe was
given ἐν πίστει; finally, he insists that both documents were issued for
some still undisclosed motive, on the basis of an agreement that Adme-
tos eventually did not honour. All this means that, in Dionysios’ account
at least, he did not actually borrow wheat from Admetos, but merely
issued two documents acknowledging so, in exchange for something that
Admetos has not performed to his satisfaction. Undisclosed until the
future trial remain only the details of the performance expected from
Admetos in this quid pro quo, and the damages that the alleged unfulfil-
ment has brought about. What we do know is that, despite what has been
generally assumed, according to Dionysios the loan in this case was not
real but ‘fictitious’, as this type of transaction is usually styled; or, to
recover an older, maybe preferable expression, ‘imaginary’.47
If this hypothesis holds true, our document is one further example of
the survival in Egypt of an institution perceived by Rome as distinctively
Greek, if we are to believe the reports of Gaius and the Pseudo-Asconius:48
the use of the daneion syngraphe as a general means of undertaking liability
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47 Fictitious – ’fingierte’ – is the standard term since the Pandectists and Mitteis. Fic-
tion, though, is in our legal tradition the technical term for the command of the jurisdic-
tional power or the legislator to take as fulfilled an unfulfilled legal requisite. For this reason,
it may be preferable to recover for our purpose the term ‘imaginary’, that Gaius uses pre-
cisely in this sense to describe the Roman mancipatio (imaginaria venditio, Gai 1.113 and 119,
cf. also Tit.Ulp. 20.2) and acceptilatio (imaginaria solutio, Gai 3.169 and 171). For this type of
transactions, that keep the form of an act or its apparent cause while changing its actual
purpose, Rabel famously coined the notion ‘nachgeformte Rechtsgeschäfte’: E. Rabel,
‘Nachgeformte Rechtsgeschäfte’, ZRG RA 27 (1906), pp. 290–335, and ZRG RA 28 (1907),
pp. 311–379.
48 Ps.-Ascon. in 2 Verr. 1.36.91: in syngraphis etiam contra fidem veritatis pactio venit et
non numerata quoque pecunia aut non integre numerata pro temporaria voluntate
hominum scribi solent more institutoque Graecorum; Gai 3.134: Praeterea litterarum
obligatio fieri videtur chirographis et syngraphis, id est si quis debere se aut daturum se
scribat; ita scilicet si eo nomine stipulatio non fiat. quod genus obligationis proprium
peregrinorum est. The notion, in Elizabeth A. Meyer, Legitimacy and Law in the Roman
World, Cambridge 2004, pp. 18–20, that Gaius’ videtur makes the texts contradictory
depends on interpreting this verb as a sign of uncertainty. It was not such thing: the
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for whatever cause, since the documented cause, the loan, hides the real
one and suffices for the contract to be enforceable.49
It is not always apparent when a loan is imaginary. In this case, the
hints in the document seem clear, and the suspicion is made still more
likely by a further remarkable circumstance: Dionysios’ archive is the sin-
gle most prolific source of imaginary loans known to us so far. No less
than four have been already detected in the archive: in three of them, all
but one contracted by Dionysios himself, the new loan absorbs and there-
fore cancels the old one, as a form of novation50 – which presumably
Roman jurisprudence uses it constantly to state uncontroverted points of law, merely as
a cautious sign that all jurisprudential formulation of the law is by its own nature provi-
sional. In this case, it is further justified by the fact that Gaius is establishing an only
approximate analogy between the Greek practice and the Roman obligatio litteris.
49 On this practice, after the truly ground-breaking L. Mitteis, Reichsrecht und Volksrecht
in den östlichen Provinzen des römischen Kaiserreichs, Leipzig 1891, pp. 460–498, cf. among the
inexhaustible literature: Rabel, ‘Nachgeformte’ (cit. n. 1), pp. 319–44; R. Taubenschlag,
‘Die Novation im Rechte der Papyri’, ZRG RA 51 (1931), pp. 84–91 (= Opera Minora ii,
Warszawa 1959, pp. 557–566); W. Kunkel, v. syngrapha, PWRE iv A 2 (München 1932),
coll. 1376–1388; F. Pringsheim, The Greek Law of Sale, Weimar 1950, pp. 244–267; 
H.-A. Rup precht, Untersuchungen zum Darlehen im Recht der graeco-aegyptischen Papyri der
Ptolomäerzeit, Stuttgart 1967, pp. 118–147; G. Thür, ‘Fictitious loans and novatio: IG vii
3172, UPZ ii 190, and C. Pap. Jud.i 24 reconsidered’, PapCongr. xxv, pp. 757–762. A related –
but different – question is the dispute concerning the existence in the Greek and Egyptian
traditions of ‘dispositive’ – as opposed to merely ‘probatory’ – documents: on this, cf. the
careful reappraisal by H. J. Wolff, Das Recht der Griechischen Papyri Ägyptens, München
1978, pp. 141–169, with lit.
50 P. Dion. 9 (= P. Rein. i 7 = MChr. 16 = C. Ptol. Sklav. i 17, c. 139 bc, Hermopolites), is an
enteuxis of Dionysios’ father, Kephalas, requesting protection against his creditor, who
forced him to renew his liability issuing an ‘Egyptian syngraphe’ for 10 talents of bronze,
although the debt had already been paid –  or so Kephalas claims; P. Dion. 26 (= P. Rein. i
31, 116 bc, Hermopolis) is nominally a loan granted to Dionysios by Hermias for 150
artabae of wheat, that in truth have not been delivered: in fact, after the ordinary
ἐδάνεισ[εν Ἑρµίας…] … Διονυσίω[ι…]… πυροῦ στερεοῦ ἀρτ 2[άβας ἑκατὸν πεν]τήκοντα,
the document proceeds (ll. 6–9): τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν τὸ δ 2[άνειον ὃ προσ]ω2φείληκεν Διονύσιος
Ἑρµίαι ἀπ[ὸ συγγραφῆς δαν]είου οὗ συνῆρται αὐτῶι 1 ἅµα τῆι συγ 4[γραφῆι ταύτηι
ἀ]ναφεροµένηι – ‘this is the loan that Dionysios owed still to Hermias by virtue of a loan
syngraphe cancelled by him at the same time that this contract has been brought.’ P. Dion. 27
(= P. Rein. i 8, 113–112 bc, Hermopolis), is nominally a loan of wheat taken by Dionysios and
his mother from Dioskourides; in truth, again, they have not received the wheat, since
they already owed it to the same Dioskourides by virtue of previous contracts, that the
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meant an adjournment for the debtor, and for the creditor, as a result of
the consolidation of capital and unpaid interests, a renewed and more
profitable calculation of the interest rate. The fourth instance, less sure
than the others, may have served as a means of having a loan secured by
guarantors.51 Our own papyrus would be yet a fifth imaginary loan in the
archive, and one serving a different purpose: here, in fact, there seems to
be no novation or guarantee of a previous debt, but a quid pro quo that the
creditor did not fulfil. 
All these imaginary loans, together with the cases of a money loan for-
malized as a wheat loan (supra, n. 22), counsel caution regarding Naphtali
Lewis’ hypothesis about the speculative purpose of Dionysios’ loan con-
tracts. Convincing as it is in general, it cannot be extended to every loan
document in the archive: in some cases at least, the document demonstra-
bly serves a different purpose than actually acquiring wheat to speculate on
its price.
Regarding P. Dion. 11 and 12, the imaginary loan hypothesis provides
also an explanation for the peculiar turn of phrase τιθέναι ἐν πίστει συγ -
γραφ4ὴν ὑποθήκης, that had puzzled Mitteis and Rabel. Mitteis’ unlikely
idea, that the object hypothecated by Dionysios was not the land but a
hypothec syngraphe that he had received from his own debtor, becomes
unnecessary. The emphasis on the document, that misled Mitteis, is, in
fact, inevitable if the transaction consisted only in the documents, the
loan having never actually been received.
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new one renovates and therefore cancels: ἐδάνεισεν Διοσκουρίδης … [… Διονυσίωι…] …
[… καὶ τῆι] τ 2ο 2ύ 2του µητρὶ Δηµητρία2ι πυροῦ στερεοῦ [ἀρτάβας ἑκατὸ]ν2 τεσσαρά κοντα δύο,
ἃς 2 προσωφειλ 1[ήκασιν οἱ δε]δ 2ανεισµένοι Διοσκουρίδει ἀπ 2ὸ συναλλαγ 4[µάτων αὐτῶ]ι
συνηρµένων ἅµα τῆι σ[υ]γγραφῆι ταύ 2[τηι ἀναφεροµέ]νηι (ll. 2–10).
51 P. Dion. 17 (= P. Rein. i 20 = MChr. 133, 108 bc, Akoris) is an ordinary loan syngraphe
whereby Dionysios borrows form another Dionysios, son of Asklepiades, 33⅓ artabae of
wheat. But, as Th. Reinach observed (P. Rein. i, p. 105 n.2), the transaction seems con-
nected to P. Rein. Dem. 3, a demotic syngraphe with the exact same date, whereby two
women acknowledge to have received from the same creditor 50 artabae, ‘including the
interest rate’. These two women (Dionysios’ wife and mother?), seem thus to secure his
loan by a separate imaginary one. This demotic contract together with the expression
‘Egyptian syngraphe in P. Dion. 9 (supra, n. 50) raise doubts regarding the pure Greek roots
of this practice in Egypt (supra, n. 48: ‘more institutoque Graecorum’).
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Also the expression ἐν πίστει appears now under a new light. It is of
course possible that it means merely ‘in guarantee’. But, as we have seen
(supra, p. 23 and n. 38), the pleonastic ‘I hypothecate in guarantee’ has no
parallel in our sources. For the editors of P. Dion. these terms would
merely underline Dionysios’ good faith.52 More likely seems to me that ἐν
πίστει refers here to the fact that, by issuing the documents without hav-
ing actually received the loan, and before Admetos performed his due,
Dionysios was indeed acting on trust. It is only natural that he underlines
this fact, if, as he claims, such trust has been violated.53
This sense of ἐν πίστει is fairly general: whenever one of the parties in
a reciprocal agreement anticipates his own performance or liability we
can say that he acts ἐν πίστει. Thus, in P. Oxy. xii 1413 (ad 272, Oxyrhyn-
chos), ll. 32–33, ἐν πίστι ἀναλίσκεται means to pay in advance.54 For the
same reason, the English word ‘credit’ means ‘trust’ and ‘trustworthiness’,
but also ‘loan’ or any transaction whereby we receive goods or services for
a deferred payment. In this same sense, the Roman jurist Ulpian, com-
menting the rubric de rebus creditis in the praetorian Edict, observes that
credere is a rather general term, referred to any contract whereby we put
our trust (fides) in someone else (omnes contractus, quos alienam fidem secuti
instituimus), since it can be said that we ‘give credit’ whenever we trust
52 P. Dion., p. 169, comm. ad l. 10. The idea is unfortunate: ἐν πίστει may mean ‘in guar-
antee’, or ‘in trust’, but certainly not ‘in good faith’. In Roman times, when it became nec-
essary to find a translation for bona fides, it was obvious that it could not be just πίστις, but
καλὴ πίστις. Also unfortunate are the considerations of Boswinkel & Pestman, ibid., 
on ὠνὴ ἐν πίστει. On the ὠνὴ ἐν πίστει problem problem, supra, n. 23 and n. 41.
53 Unacceptable, in any case, the interpretation of Schmitz, Ἡπίστις (cit. n. 1), p. 36, for
whom πίστις denotes here the trust that Admetos, as creditor, has placed in Dionysios. 
Against such interpretation it is enough to observe that the subject of ἐθέµην ἐν πίστει is
not Admetos but Dionysios.
54 The papyrus reports several debates in the senate of Oxyrhynchos. In the last pre-
served one, from l. 25, the prytanis informs that 12 extra talents are to be spent in the com-
pletion of a golden crown. In ll. 32–33, the syndic promises to report any payments made
in advance to the artificers: Σεπτίµιος Διογένης ὁ καὶ Ἀγαθὸς Δαίµων γενόµ[ενος
ὑποµνηµατογράφος | καὶ ὡς χρηµα(τίζει) σύνδικος εἶπ(εν)· – c. ? – εἴ τι τοῖ]ς2 τεχνείταις ἐν
πίστι ἀναλίσκεται, παρατεθήσεται ὑµῖν. Paying ἐν πίστει means here clearly paying in
advance.
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someone, accepting that only later we will receive something (cui cum que
rei adsentiamur alienam fidem secuti mox recepturi quid): credere is, in this large
sense, equivalent to ‘fidem sequi’.55
A trivial remark in place of conclusion. Generations of legal scholars
have for centuries devoted their attention to the Roman fides from every
conceivable point of view. Many aspects of the Greek πίστις remain,
instead, virtually unexplored: for legal historians, if not a land of promise,
then at least a promising land. 
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55 D. 12.1.1.1 (Ulpianus 26 ad ed.): Quoniam igitur multa ad contractus varios pertinentia
iura sub hoc titulo praetor inseruit, ideo rerum creditarum titulum praemisit: omnes enim
contractus, quos alienam fidem secuti instituimus, complectitur: nam, ut libro primo quaes-
tionum Celsus ait, credendi generalis appellatio est: ideo sub hoc titulo praetor et de com-
modato et de pignore edixit. nam cuicumque rei adsentiamur alienam fidem secuti mox
recepturi quid, ex hoc contractu credere dicimur. … – The Praetor has inserted under this
Title many rules referred to various contracts, and it is for this reason that he has prefixed
as a Title the words ‘Things which are credited’, for this includes every contract concluded
relying upon the faith of others. As Celsus states in the first Book of his Questions, the term
‘to credit’ is a general one, and hence also the edicts concerning property lent and pledged
fall under this Title. For whenever we, relying upon the faith of others, assent to anything
whereby we shall afterwards receive something, then we are said to give credit by virtue of
such contract. … [tr. Scott, with substantial emendations].
